Based on the results of the Armenia-EU-USA meeting in Brussels on the 5th of April, the scale of the forthcoming political and military support from the US and the EU promises to be unprecedented. This leads to the conclusion that Georgia has finally and irrevocably "dropped out" of the list of allies of the West in the South Caucasus region, and the bet is on Armenia.

Why this has happened is also clear. Even though Georgians in Georgia have no illusions about the Kremlin's attitude towards their country and reciprocate it, the majority of Georgians have not begun to perceive the Russian people as an enemy. In Georgia, there is a clear division between the authorities and the people when it comes to Russia. That is why the flow of Russian tourists to Georgia has increased recently.

And most importantly, the Georgians do not intend to "wipe themselves out" in the war against Russia. The Georgian people do not have such a degree of nationalist hatred and Russophobia (as well as hatred towards other nations) that they would fight fiercely in the interests of others.

Armenia is a completely different case. There, nationalist hatred of other nations, including Russophobia, is off the scale. Armenian nationalists calmly killed their Azerbaijani neighbours, with whom they had just lived as good neighbours. So, if their new masters order it, they will also kill Russians, for whom the West now needs them as "allies". All the more so because Armenian terrorists killed Russians even during the Dashnak terror of the early twentieth century, and during the Soviet Union they began their "struggle for independence" in the seventies of the last century with terrorist attacks in the Moscow metro.

Let's break down the details of Western aid to Armenia. They can be divided into points:

USA - Armenia

1. The United States will provide expert assistance to Yerevan on the Strategic Defence Review and the development of a new Armenian military doctrine.

Armenia's military doctrine is being changed with the help of the United States and in the interests of the United States, with the interests of Armenia's neighbours being minimised or not taken into account at all. Including the interests of Georgia. Especially when Georgia "dares" to pursue an independent policy and protect its national interests. We can see how the West and the US are trying to "twist the arms" of the Georgian government, which only "dared" to limit the influence of externally funded organisations. And Armenian's "fifth column" has also joined anti-government actions. There are even "activists" from Armenia visiting Georgia.

There can be no doubt that the new military doctrine of the Republic of Armenia will include the same doctrine of the "historical great Armenia", which, it should be remembered, includes Georgian Samtskhe-Javakheti (in the terminology of Armenian nationalists "Javakhk"). It is therefore unlikely that a change in the initially aggressive military doctrine of its neighbour will be "harmless" for Georgia. Especially since the change in military doctrine will be accompanied by active financial and technical support from the United States.

2. Bilateral military cooperation will be directed towards achieving Armenia's partnership goals with NATO through the Planning and Exploration Process (PARP) and the Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC).

The Planning and Review Process (PARP) and the Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC) are key elements of Partners' cooperation with NATO. PARP is designed to help Partners achieve their defence goals and improve the compatibility of their armed forces with NATO. In essence, this clause means that Armenia's armed forces will be brought closer to NATO standards.

3. The United States will provide the necessary assistance to develop Armenia's military and defence capabilities significantly and to strengthen border control and security, with particular attention to the border with Iran.

Iran is unlikely to be an "enemy" of an Armenia dependent on Western assistance.  There are no disputed territories on this border. And it is not necessary to "strengthen border control" on the bridge over the Arax River with the help of the United States. Nevertheless, the US will arm and equip the Armenian border guards. Who will these border guards be used against?  Considering that the Armenian border guards have been "moving" the Armenian-Georgian border in the direction of Georgia for the past three decades without American assistance, it can be assumed that this "practice" will continue. And by such "creeping movement of the border" Armenia has illegally seized one of the most important Georgian holy places - the Khujabi Monastery. Thus, the US aid to Armenia for "strengthening border control and security" is an obvious risk for Georgia, which is linked to the continuation of the "creeping occupation" of Georgian territory by Armenia.

Moreover, by becoming a US ally and receiving US military aid, Armenia not only does not want to antagonise Iran, but also wants to "provide" Iran with access to the Black Sea. It is no coincidence that the Brussels meeting was followed by a conference in Tehran on the development of economic cooperation between Iran and Armenia.

Speaking at the opening of the conference, Bahman Eshghi, Secretary General of the Tehran Chamber of Commerce, said that "Armenia is Iran's gateway to the Black Sea, the Anatolian region and the Eurasian Economic Union, and is considered a link between the Caspian region and maritime Europe, as well as the route of the New Silk Road". Bahman Eshghi did not mention that the gateway to the Black Sea is first and foremost Georgia, to which Iran is linked not only through Armenia but also through Azerbaijan.

In this regard, there is a real danger that Armenia will use the military and political support it receives from the United States not to "confront" Iran, but to "cut off a corridor to the Black Sea" through Georgian territory for both itself and Iran.

4. The United States will send analytical teams to Armenia to conduct an on-site assessment of its air force and air defence capabilities, taking into account Armenia's integration into the CSTO Joint Air Defence System.

The United States is interested in changing the structure of military engagement with Armenia regarding the air defence system. The deployment of US assessment teams to Armenia is part of a strategy aimed at reassessing and reorganising the Armenian Air Force and Air Defence Forces, taking into account the country's ongoing integration into the CSTO air defence system.

The move fits into the broader context of the US desire to reduce Russian and CSTO influence in the region. Some of this work is already underway, as evidenced by the radar systems supplied by France to Armenia. In this context, the US plans to play a key role in providing technology, training and assistance to strengthen Armenian air defences, thereby reducing Russian military influence over Yerevan.

5. The United States will provide funds to Armenia under the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) programme to facilitate Armenia's access to advanced military equipment and the latest technology.

The Foreign Military Financing (FMF) programme is a key instrument of US foreign policy designed to assist US allies and partners by providing grants or loans for the purchase of equipment, training, and other military needs. The programme helps strengthen the defence capabilities of recipient countries and improves the interoperability of their armed forces.

Through the FMF, the United States aims to facilitate Armenia's access to modern military technologies and high-tech equipment. The United States has not even promised Georgia such access. This means that the relative military parity between Georgia and Armenia will shift sharply in favour of the latter.

6. US forces will participate in joint military exercises and training with the Armenian armed forces to ensure interoperability.

Joint U.S.-Armenian military exercises will inevitably lead to an increase in the overall combat capability of the Armenian army. Relying on such an army, Armenia will be able to truly threaten the security and territorial integrity of its neighbours. This includes Georgia, where Armenia has not only actively supported separatist regimes in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region, but also has a separatist underground in Samtskhe-Javakheti.

7. The United States will strengthen Armenia's defence capabilities through the International Military Education and Training (IMET) programme.

Again, we are talking about the training of the Armenian armed forces by the Americans. This programme is one of the key instruments of US foreign military assistance aimed at strengthening bilateral military relations through training courses.

8. The United States will work to accelerate the widespread use of GPS technology throughout Armenia.

The Second Karabakh War revealed Armenia's lag in the use of advanced military technology and drones, as well as in the accuracy of weapons guidance. The United States intends to close this gap.

The introduction of GPS (Global Positioning System) technology into the Armenian military is playing a crucial role in improving the accuracy and effectiveness of military operations. GPS enables troops to navigate accurately in complex or unfamiliar terrain, greatly improving mobility and rapid response to changing circumstances. Modern unmanned aerial vehicles and other autonomous systems make extensive use of GPS to navigate and perform tasks such as reconnaissance, surveillance and attack. As a result, the Armenian army is becoming more "high-tech" than the Georgian army.

EU - Armenia

9. The European Union will adopt an assistance package under the European Peace Facility (EPF) in support of the Armenian Armed Forces. This package aims to strengthen Armenia's national security, stability and sustainability in the defence sector. It will also improve operational effectiveness, accelerate compliance with EU and NATO standards and ensure interoperability of the Armenian Armed Forces. The assistance package also aims to enhance the capacity of the Armenian Armed Forces to participate in EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operations and missions.

There are indications that a consensus has already been reached in the EU to adopt the assistance package for Armenia through the European Peace Facility (EPF). This EU decision is also intended to promote closer cooperation between Armenia and the EU in the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy. The EU has not even promised similar assistance to Georgia.

10. The EU and Armenia will hold regular consultations on defence and security issues.

As in the case of the United States, regular consultations between the EU and Armenia are foreseen, focusing on deepening defence and security cooperation. These consultations will also contribute to Armenia's closer integration into European and transatlantic security structures. In terms of such integration, Armenia will also "overtake" Georgia and become a more "desirable" security partner for the EU in the South Caucasus region than our country.

11. The European Union expresses its support for the decision of the Government of Armenia to withdraw the troops of the Border Guard Service of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation from the Zvartnots International Airport, the Armenian-Iranian border and all other international border points.

The complete withdrawal of Armenia from Russian influence and the loss of Russia's "military" bridgeheads in that country may force Russia to "cling" even more firmly to occupied Georgian Abkhazia and Samachablo and to Russian military bases in these Georgian regions "on this side of the Greater Caucasus Ridge". This in itself makes the restoration of Georgia's territorial integrity even more remote.

12. The EU and Armenia are actively discussing the future status of the Russian Federation's military facilities in Armenia, as the current agreement provides for their presence until 2044.

Recently, the European Union and Armenia have been actively discussing various options for the future of Russian military bases on Armenian territory in the margins of the meeting, which was reflected in the outcome of the meeting in Brussels. The withdrawal of the Russian military contingent from the territory of Armenia is one of the strategic goals of the EU and US policy on Armenia, and various scenarios are being considered, including the creation of a hotbed of tension around the 102nd Russian airbase.

Here too there is a risk of drawing Georgia into a global military confrontation. Finally, in the event of a conflict over the 102nd Russian base, Russia may well drive a "military corridor" through Georgian territory to it, significantly expanding the zone of Russian occupation, which already occupies 20 per cent of Georgian territory.

13. The EU and Armenia discussed the need to reduce Yerevan's dependence on Russian military equipment and technology, as well as the need to reduce dependence on Russian military education and training.

The EU has set itself the task of actively influencing the development of the human resources and military-technical potential of the Armenian armed forces. This process has already begun. Armen Grigoryan, Secretary of the Security Council of Armenia, has already stated in an interview with public television that in 2020-24 Russia's share in arms supply agreements with Armenia will fall from 96 per cent to less than 10 per cent. But Armenia's military dependence on France and India, which are already actively arming Armenia, will increase. These countries will not supply modern weapons to Georgia.

14. Armenia will ensure the long-term presence of the EU Mission in Armenia (EUMA) and expand its functions by significantly increasing its personnel.

The EU Mission in Armenia (EUMA) is now becoming an information and intelligence base for NATO, and more specifically for one particular NATO country - France. There are plans for a significant increase in the mission's personnel and an expansion of its functions. Moreover, as US Ambassador to Armenia Christine Quinn recently stated, Washington has not yet discussed joining the EU mission, but does not rule out the possibility in the future. Such a development will definitely lead to the strengthening of the extra-regional presence on the territory of Armenia, which will increase tensions in the region.

15. The EU will assist Armenia in building up defence infrastructure on the border with Azerbaijan, including technical reinforcements.

Such EU aid to Armenia is gradually turning the notional, as yet undeclared, border with Azerbaijan into a real front line. Technical fortifications and numerous firing positions are being built. It is important to note that Armenia has not yet renounced its constitutionally enshrined territorial claims against Azerbaijan and Turkey. Armenia's claims to Samtskhe-Javakheti are similar to Georgia's, except that the Armenian nationalists have not yet incorporated them into their state's constitution.

16. The EU and Armenia will cooperate on border security and control issues through the border troops of the Armenian National Security Service and the European Union Agency for the Security of the External Borders (Frontex).

EU-Armenia cooperation on border security through Frontex can be seen as another step against the interests of the countries in the region. Frontex, the EU's border and migration management agency, plays an important role in strengthening the Commonwealth's external borders by providing control and surveillance, which, according to the Brussels agreements, will be extended to Armenia's borders.

Such cooperation in the context of current geopolitical tensions is yet another attempt by the EU to reduce Russian influence in Armenia, in particular to "replace" Russian border guards in Armenia. This could provoke retaliation from Russia, up to and including military intervention, in order to maintain its influence - again through the territory of Georgia.

17. EU and US member states will offer assistance in training and equipping Armenia's newly created Foreign Intelligence Service, as well as improving the capacity and training of the State Guard.

It is expected that Armenia will receive significant technical and expert assistance in this area, which will allow the Armenian Foreign Intelligence Service to significantly expand its operational capabilities. The activities of the Armenian foreign intelligence and special services are already directed against Georgia, so this is another threat to the security and internal stability of our country.

18. An EU-Armenia Cyber Dialogue will be launched to strengthen the strategic capabilities of Armenia's Cyber Emergency Response Team (CERT) and Cyber Security and Incident Response Team (CSIRT).

From a cybersecurity perspective, Georgia could become more vulnerable in this area. Especially if the unfriendly intelligence services of its neighbour gain additional capabilities with the help of the EU.

US-EU-Armenia

19. The United States and the European Union will assist Armenia in dismantling the Metsamor nuclear power plant (MNPP) through the Nuclear Decommissioning Programme (DNPP). Once Metsamor is deactivated, funding will be provided for the development of new nuclear power plants.

The problem of the outdated and dangerous Metsamor nuclear power plant and its spent fuel is one of the key issues for the security of the South Caucasus region. It should be shut down immediately and placed under international control. The US and EU appear ready to assist Armenia in the gradual decommissioning of Metsamor and the development of new nuclear power projects. But at each of these stages, without international control, the risk of nuclear catastrophe and nuclear terrorism on the part of the Armenian revanchists not only does not diminish, but increases.

20. The U.S. and the European Union will establish a joint military and defence task force to coordinate the implementation of Armenia's defence and security sustainability programme.

The EU and the US have agreed to supply lethal weapons to Armenia. Deliveries of offensive weapons are also expected. As a result, Yerevan will receive what the West did not provide to Georgia and refused to provide to Ukraine for many years.

Bringing the Armenian army into full compliance with NATO standards, expelling the Russian military from Armenia and the pro-Russian elements in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia - all these actions point to preparations for Armenia's possible accession to NATO in the medium term. At the same time, the West is opening its arms market to Armenia and financing its arms purchases. Nothing similar has been done for Georgia, even though the country was subjected to external aggression in 2008.

All this means one thing: from now on Armenia is the West's "favourite" in the South Caucasus, which can do anything it likes. Even against countries that have never been "their own" for the West.

After all, even from a religious and ideological point of view, neither Georgia nor Azerbaijan "correspond" to the values of the West, especially the modern ones. Georgia is an Orthodox country, Azerbaijan a Muslim country, and they "dare" to defend their interests, national identity and cultural values. While Armenia, apparently for the sake of revanchist aspirations, agrees to become part of the ram of the "Western project" and to fulfil all the wishes of the "new masters".

George Mazniashvili