The Abkhazians have been in a state of near-shock in recent days because of statements made by former Russian President and current Deputy Security Council of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev, who, it will be recalled, recognised their 'independence' when he was President of the Russian Federation in 2008.
Today, in his interview on the future of the separatist regimes of Sukhumi and Tskhinvali, Dmitry Medvedev made the following remarks:

"There is talk again of Georgia's possible admission to NATO... We do not need a repetition of the history of 2008. We remain ready to solve problems at the negotiating table in the spirit of the UN Charter. But if our concerns become real, we will not hesitate. In Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the idea of joining Russia is still popular. And it may well be realised if there are good reasons for it"..

Dmitry Medvedev's statement that Abkhazia's "independence" would soon come to an end shocked Abkhazian society to such an extent that for almost 24 hours in Sukhumi, most of those who like to make statements now and then remained silent. On the one hand, they became "bolder" and began to swear an "alliance" with Russia, while at the same time declaring that "sovereignty of Abkhazia is out of the question" only after a well-known servant of the Armenian lobby, MP Konstantin Zatulin, spoke out against a rapid takeover of Abkhazia and Samachablo by Russia.

At the same time, Zatulin made it clear in his statement that he opposed Russia's annexation of Sukhumi and Tskhinvali not so much because Abkhazians and Ossetians might be ambivalent about it, but because of the current political interests of the Kremlin, which does not want clearly anti-Russian forces to come to power in Georgia:

"The second circumstance is the readiness of the Russian Federation for such an accession, the expediency for Russia to support the idea of incorporating Abkhazia and South Ossetia into Russia. The incorporation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia would immediately affect Russia's relations with other states in the region, first of all with Georgia, and would confirm the opinion of Georgian radicals, supporters of Saakashvili, that these territories were in fact seized, occupied, that Russia is an aggressor and an annexationist. And the domestic political situation in Georgia itself, under the influence of these emotions, would have swung in favour of the supporters of Mikheil Saakashvili and the struggle with Russia to a victorious end. I ask the question: at the moment when we are conducting a special military operation, do we need to aggravate these relations or not? I think not"., Zatulin stated.

The Russian telegram channel Nabat, which is well versed in the nuances of Kremlin policy, described the Kremlin's interests in Abkhazia and Samachablo much more clearly than Zatulin:

"Russia is the only guarantor of keeping Abkhazia within its borders and South Ossetia within its borders. But we are talking about borders, about land. Russia may well trade the sovereignty of both countries for a union state with Georgia, because that is more in Russia's interests than keeping Tskhinvali and Sukhumi sovereign but having a pro-Western Georgia.

A few years ago, when we were arguing that Sukhumi could become part of Russia or part of a Russian-Belarusian union state, I was pelted with slippers and rotten tomatoes. I said that such a step would have preserved the real sovereignty of these countries. Yes, foreign policy would be taken away from them, but everything else would be in their power. Today the situation is very different. Today, Moscow itself will prevent Sukhumi and Tskhinval from attempting to unite or join. The stakes have changed and the political conjuncture has changed. Whatever elites have grown, as Zatulin writes, they will not be able to resist Moscow's decisions.

Both Abkhazia and South Ossetia are now waiting to see what happens after the SWO. The world will be reformatted globally and Georgia will have to look for a strong shoulder to survive on. And it will not have to choose between Russia, the US and the EU. But between Turkey and Russia. This is how things are likely to play out. It is unlikely that Tbilisi will choose Turkey. Moscow is not only stronger, but also clearer, more predictable and, most importantly, Moscow holds the key to solving the Abkhazian and South Ossetian problems.

I repeat: the reunification of Abkhazia and South Ossetia with Georgia is possible ONLY under the condition of the reunification of Russia and Georgia. Do you think this is an illusion? Ask yourself a question: would you have thought ten or fifteen years ago that Kherson and Melitopol would become Russian? Although such a development was seen, it looked just as fantastic".

This makes it clear what the Kremlin's main interest is in Georgia and its occupied territories. The main interest is "reunification", or simply put, the complete annexation and occupation of Georgia and the elimination of its statehood.

It is clear that in this case the fake "statehood" of the separatists of Sukhumi and Tskhinvali will be liquidated first, without even asking the separatists themselves. Discontented people can be "treated" in hospitals (as has already happened with the separatist puppet Sergei Bagapsh, who no longer satisfies his masters), or even simply put on a plane and arrange a "plane crash". One way or another, but the interests of the separatists in Sukhumi and Tskhinvali and their desire to preserve "state sovereignty" will be the last to be considered. The only thing the various forces in Moscow may disagree on today is the tactics of seizing Georgia.

Dmitry Medvedev's "announcement" of the annexation of Abkhazia and Samara was in fact an acknowledgement of a possible aggression against Georgia and the occupation of all its remaining territory. All this under the same pretext of "countering NATO", under which Russian troops invaded Ukraine in 2022. The Georgian political scientist Levan Pirveli, in a conversation with the Russian journalist Maxim Shevchenko, noted that Dmitry Medvedev's statement about "joining" Abkhazia and so-called "South Ossetia" to Russia should be understood as an announcement of the future occupation of all of Georgia.

Why Russia needs to occupy Georgia is also obvious. First, against the background of the failures in Ukraine, such an occupation will give Russian society a long-awaited "military victory with little blood", which will amuse the "great power" consciousness of the common man. Secondly, it will cut off the Middle Silk Road and all energy and transport links that pass through Georgia, and thirdly, it is the occupation of Georgia that gives Russia a "military corridor" to Armenia and allows Armenian revanchists to hope to regain Azerbaijani Karabakh, relying on the "Artsakh" separatists, who are still under the protection of Russian peacekeepers, etc.
Unfortunately, there are very high risks that both the pro-Russian Armenian lobby and the pro-Armenian "fifth column" in Georgia will start to undermine the internal situation in the country in order to provoke a new Russian aggression.Medvedev's statement on the possible annexation of Abkhazia and Samachablo and the threat of occupation of the whole of Georgia
The Abkhazians have been in a state of near-shock in recent days because of statements made by former Russian President and current Deputy Security Council of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev, who, it will be recalled, recognised their 'independence' when he was President of the Russian Federation in 2008.
Today, in his interview on the future of the separatist regimes of Sukhumi and Tskhinvali, Dmitry Medvedev made the following remarks:
"There is talk again of Georgia's possible admission to NATO... We do not need a repetition of the history of 2008. We remain ready to solve problems at the negotiating table in the spirit of the UN Charter. But if our concerns become real, we will not hesitate. In Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the idea of joining Russia is still popular. And it may well be realised if there are good reasons for it"..
Dmitry Medvedev's statement that Abkhazia's "independence" would soon come to an end shocked Abkhazian society to such an extent that for almost 24 hours in Sukhumi, most of those who like to make statements now and then remained silent. On the one hand, they became "bolder" and began to swear an "alliance" with Russia, while at the same time declaring that "sovereignty of Abkhazia is out of the question" only after a well-known servant of the Armenian lobby, MP Konstantin Zatulin, spoke out against a rapid takeover of Abkhazia and Samachablo by Russia.
At the same time, Zatulin made it clear in his statement that he opposed Russia's annexation of Sukhumi and Tskhinvali not so much because Abkhazians and Ossetians might be ambivalent about it, but because of the current political interests of the Kremlin, which does not want clearly anti-Russian forces to come to power in Georgia:
"The second circumstance is the readiness of the Russian Federation for such an accession, the expediency for Russia to support the idea of incorporating Abkhazia and South Ossetia into Russia. The incorporation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia would immediately affect Russia's relations with other states in the region, first of all with Georgia, and would confirm the opinion of Georgian radicals, supporters of Saakashvili, that these territories were in fact seized, occupied, that Russia is an aggressor and an annexationist. And the domestic political situation in Georgia itself, under the influence of these emotions, would have swung in favour of the supporters of Mikheil Saakashvili and the struggle with Russia to a victorious end. I ask the question: at the moment when we are conducting a special military operation, do we need to aggravate these relations or not? I think not"., Zatulin stated.
The Russian telegram channel Nabat, which is well versed in the nuances of Kremlin policy, described the Kremlin's interests in Abkhazia and Samachablo much more clearly than Zatulin:
"Russia is the only guarantor of keeping Abkhazia within its borders and South Ossetia within its borders. But we are talking about borders, about land. Russia may well trade the sovereignty of both countries for a union state with Georgia, because that is more in Russia's interests than keeping Tskhinvali and Sukhumi sovereign but having a pro-Western Georgia.
A few years ago, when we were arguing that Sukhumi could become part of Russia or part of a Russian-Belarusian union state, I was pelted with slippers and rotten tomatoes. I said that such a step would have preserved the real sovereignty of these countries. Yes, foreign policy would be taken away from them, but everything else would be in their power. Today the situation is very different. Today, Moscow itself will prevent Sukhumi and Tskhinval from attempting to unite or join. The stakes have changed and the political conjuncture has changed. Whatever elites have grown, as Zatulin writes, they will not be able to resist Moscow's decisions.
Both Abkhazia and South Ossetia are now waiting to see what happens after the SWO. The world will be reformatted globally and Georgia will have to look for a strong shoulder to survive on. And it will not have to choose between Russia, the US and the EU. But between Turkey and Russia. This is how things are likely to play out. It is unlikely that Tbilisi will choose Turkey. Moscow is not only stronger, but also clearer, more predictable and, most importantly, Moscow holds the key to solving the Abkhazian and South Ossetian problems.
I repeat: the reunification of Abkhazia and South Ossetia with Georgia is possible ONLY under the condition of the reunification of Russia and Georgia. Do you think this is an illusion? Ask yourself a question: would you have thought ten or fifteen years ago that Kherson and Melitopol would become Russian? Although such a development was seen, it looked just as fantastic".
This makes it clear what the Kremlin's main interest is in Georgia and its occupied territories. The main interest is "reunification", or simply put, the complete annexation and occupation of Georgia and the elimination of its statehood.
It is clear that in this case the fake "statehood" of the separatists of Sukhumi and Tskhinvali will be liquidated first, without even asking the separatists themselves. Discontented people can be "treated" in hospitals (as has already happened with the separatist puppet Sergei Bagapsh, who no longer satisfies his masters), or even simply put on a plane and arrange a "plane crash". One way or another, but the interests of the separatists in Sukhumi and Tskhinvali and their desire to preserve "state sovereignty" will be the last to be considered. The only thing the various forces in Moscow may disagree on today is the tactics of seizing Georgia.
Dmitry Medvedev's "announcement" of the annexation of Abkhazia and Samara was in fact an acknowledgement of a possible aggression against Georgia and the occupation of all its remaining territory. All this under the same pretext of "countering NATO", under which Russian troops invaded Ukraine in 2022. The Georgian political scientist Levan Pirveli, in a conversation with the Russian journalist Maxim Shevchenko, noted that Dmitry Medvedev's statement about "joining" Abkhazia and so-called "South Ossetia" to Russia should be understood as an announcement of the future occupation of all of Georgia.
Why Russia needs to occupy Georgia is also obvious. First, against the background of the failures in Ukraine, such an occupation will give Russian society a long-awaited "military victory with little blood", which will amuse the "great power" consciousness of the common man. Secondly, it will cut off the Middle Silk Road and all energy and transport links that pass through Georgia, and thirdly, it is the occupation of Georgia that gives Russia a "military corridor" to Armenia and allows Armenian revanchists to hope to regain Azerbaijani Karabakh, relying on the "Artsakh" separatists, who are still under the protection of Russian peacekeepers, etc.
Unfortunately, there are very high risks that both the pro-Russian Armenian lobby and the pro-Armenian "fifth column" in Georgia will start to undermine the internal situation in the country in order to provoke a new Russian aggression.

Alexandre Zakariadze