In the event of the death of President Ebrahim Raisi, the Islamic Republic of Iran is scheduled to hold early presidential elections on 28 June 2024. Analysts have suggested that, based on current polling data, none of the candidates is likely to secure an absolute majority of votes in the first round. As a result, a second round of elections may be required. However, it seems that the favourites have already been decided.

According to the latest polls, three candidates are leading and have good chances of winning: former Health Minister Masoud Pezeshkian, Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bakir Ghalibaf, and conservative politician and representative of Iran's religious leader in the Supreme National Security Council, Saeed Jalili.

Masoud Pezeshkian hails from Iranian Azerbaijan and served as health minister during Seyyed Mohammad Khatami's second presidential term. He was also a member of parliament and served as the first deputy chairman of the Majlis of the Islamic Consultative Council in its tenth convocation.

Analysts have Identified two key advantages for Pezeshkian. Firstly, he is the only candidate representing the reformist wing. Secondly, he is Azerbaijani, which means he can count on the votes of the vast majority of ethnic Azeris and Turks in the Islamic Republic of Iran, up to 40 percent of the country's population. For these two reasons, Pezeshkian was leading in pre-election polls.

However, there appears to be little difference between Masoud Pezeshkian and his main conservative opponent in the latest polls, Saeed Jalili. Iranian media have reported that the commander of the Sepah Quds Force, General Ismail Kaani, held mediation talks between Ghalibaf and Jalili on the eve of the election. Ghalibaf, who has long held various high government positions, has strong support among IRGC generals, although his political influence is relatively limited. This factor is considered his main chance of victory. There is a possibility that the IRGC commanders may have wanted Jalili to give up the presidency in favour of Ghalibaf. However, according to analysts, it was initially unlikely that Jalili, who had backed down in favour of Raisi three years ago, would make concessions to Ghalibaf this time. It is possible that the votes of both conservative candidates could coalesce at the end of the first round.

Should this occur in the second round, the votes of the conservative candidates backed by the IRGC will likely merge, which may have an impact on Pezeshkian's chances of winning the presidential election. However, it is important to note that conservatives in Iran are facing challenges in terms of support. Therefore, it would be valuable to consider what changes might occur in the context of the Islamic Republic of Iran, both globally and about the South Caucasus, should Maqsood Pezeshkian emerge victorious.

It is already known that Massoud Pezeshkian if he wins the election, hopes to reopen negotiations on the nuclear deal (JCPOA) and seeks to improve relations with the United States. The Guardian suggests that if he wins the election, Pezeshkian may "renegotiate" Iran's relations with Russia to ensure that "the Eastern powers (China and Russia) don't think they are the only option for Iran." It seems likely that the previous coordinated support of Moscow and Tehran for the Armenian revanchists, which has prevented the opening of transit routes in the South Caucasus (the same Zangezur corridor), will no longer be necessary. Given his Turkic heritage, it seems likely that Masoud Pezeshkian will be more supportive of initiatives that bring together Turkic countries and Georgia within the framework of the Middle Corridor. He may wish to consider including Iran in these projects.

It seems that Masoud Pezeshkian is already considering the possibility of reconsidering relations with Russia, which could indicate that Iran may move closer to other countries under his leadership. As the prospect of rapprochement with the US and the EU recedes (despite the predicted decrease in contradictions), we may anticipate a closer rapprochement with Turkey. As a reformer, Pezeshkian may also seek internal changes to improve the socio-economic situation in the country and foster more harmonious inter-ethnic relations. In particular, it may be anticipated that he will bring an end to the propagation of Persian nationalism and facilitate the preservation of the identity of Azerbaijanis and other Turkic peoples in the country. Additionally, it may be expected that Masoud Pezeshkian will abandon Tehran's previous policy of unwavering support for the anti-Azerbaijani and Turkophobic policies of the authorities in Yerevan.

Pezeshkian's election victory may be perceived by the international community as a positive signal of possible changes in Iranian policy. This could contribute to strengthening diplomatic relations and opening new opportunities for international cooperation, as well as reducing the "degree of confrontation" between Iran on the one hand and the United States and Israel on the other.

It seems that the IRGC is placing its trust in Saeed Jalili, a politician with a radical conservative orientation who is also not unfamiliar with the Azerbaijani community of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This may be a strategy to secure votes from conservative Azerbaijanis. Jalili was born on 6 September 1965, in Mashhad (Rezevi-Khorasan province). His father hailed from Birjand and held the position of principal at Nawab Safavi Primary School in Mashhad. His mother was an Azeri from Ardabil.

Today, Saeed Jalili is a member of the ruling elite of the Islamic Republic of Iran and holds positions on the Strategic Council for International Relations and the Council for Establishing Order, as well as being Ayatollah Khamenei's representative on the Supreme National Security Council. He previously served as secretary-general of the Supreme National Security Council and led the Iran-West nuclear negotiations, where he maintained a generally hardline anti-Western stance.

The election of Saeed Jalili may potentially lead to an increased likelihood of a "major war" between Israel and the US against Iran. Concerning Iranian Caucasus policy, there are currently no indications that under Saeed Jalili, the IRGC will be given unrestricted support to back the Armenian revanchists and potentially lead to a new conflict in the South Caucasus. The main source of potential instability in the region may come from France.

It would be remiss of us not to mention that Mohammad Baqir Ghalibaf, the third favourite of the Iranian presidential elections, is not a "pure-blooded Persian" either. His father, Hussein Ghalibaf, is of Kurdish descent and his mother, Khairoun Nisa Bujmehrani, is of Persian origin. He is one of the most moderate and pragmatic representatives of the conservative camp and has a stronghold within the political elite and the population. It is thought that the IRGC may favour Saeed Jalili over Mr Ghalibaf due to his perceived moderation. However, if Mr Ghalibaf makes it to the second round of elections, the IRGC will likely support Mr Jalili to prevent Mr Pezeshkian from winning. Should Muhammad Bakir Ghalibaf eventually assume the role of president, it is likely that Iran's policy will continue in a similar vein to that of Ebrahim Raisi, including about the countries of the South Caucasus.

George Mazniashvili